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Law Review Publishing: Thoughts on Mass Submissions,
Expedited Review, and Potential Reform
MICHAEL D. CICCHINI *
ABSTRACT
The current law review publishing system—in particular, mass
submissions and expedited review—works well for prestige-driven professors;
however, it places a tremendous burden on the editors of journals lower in the
hierarchy. This problem is exacerbated by several professorial tactics
including, most significantly, submitting articles to journals from which the
professor would never accept an offer—not even when he or she fails to receive
a “better” offer through the expedite process.
This Essay discusses a potential fix: the eight-hour offer window. If a
journal were to adopt a formal policy of holding its publication offers open for
only eight hours, professors would, in theory, be unable to use the offer in the
expedite process. Therefore, professors would not submit their articles to this
journal unless and until they were serious about publishing in it.
Unfortunately, what is good in theory does not always work in practice.
This Essay discusses how professors would modify their existing tactics—
tactics which currently include misrepresenting the terms of an offer in the
expedite process—in order to defeat this attempted reform. The Essay also
explores specific ways that a journal could overcome these tactics and
implement meaningful reform despite the professoriate’s desire to protect the
status quo.
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INTRODUCTION: PROBLEMS IN PUBLISHING
As a practicing criminal defense lawyer I enjoy writing law review
articles. It’s a great way to advocate for our individual rights, provide useful
information for the defense bar, and, in some cases, obtain meaningful change
within the system. I even enjoy (for the most part) the process of publishing
the articles after I write them. This year, when submitting two articles for
publication, I closely followed the Submission Angsting Spring 2017 blog post
and comment thread at PrawfsBlawg. 1 This is a public forum but one that few
people, other than law professors and would-be law professors, even know
exists. The thread essentially allows professor-types to share information and
opinions—which they nearly always do anonymously—about the law review
publishing process.
Although many law professors frequently complain about the current
process, it actually works just fine for them; however, it is a tremendous
burden for the editors at the less prestigious journals. From a journal editor’s
perspective, there are at least two significant problems with the law review
submission process. First, professors typically engage in mass submissions of
their articles, often submitting to more than one hundred journals
simultaneously. This takes a toll on the editors who must wade through
hundreds and sometimes thousands of articles before making offers to fill only
a few publication slots. 2
Second, despite all of the journal editors’ work in reviewing and selecting
articles, most professors will not accept their offers of publication. In most
cases, a professor is merely hoping to obtain an offer of publication to trigger
the expedited review process. That is, the professor intends to use the journal’s
offer to shop the article around to higher ranked journals. 3 Journal editors
know this.
However, what some journal editors may not realize is that, in many cases,
a professor submits his or her article knowing in advance that he or she would
not, under any circumstances, accept an offer to publish from that journal—
not even if the professor fails to obtain a “better” offer during the expedite
process. The reality is that many prestige-driven professors believe an article
1
Matt Bodie, Submission Angsting Spring 2017, PRAWFSBLAWG (Feb. 9, 2017),
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2017/02/submission-angsting-spring2017.html [https://perma.cc/8AP7-UNV4].
2
See infra Part I.A.
3
See infra Part I.B.
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is better left unpublished than published in, and associated with, the offering
journal. 4
The burden of these and other professorial practices falls on the journal
editors. 5 And the further down the law review hierarchy the journal is located,
the greater the risk of abuse and the greater the burden. But there is a
theoretical fix to this absurd, prestige-based law review publishing system. A
reform-minded law journal could announce, before law review submission
season begins, that its publication offers will be held open for only eight
hours. 6
In theory, this eight-hour offer—sometimes called an exploding offer—
would accomplish two things. First, because eight hours is not enough time
for professors to request an expedited review from other journals, it should
greatly increase the acceptance rate of the journal’s offers. And second,
because professors will know, before submitting to the journal, that they will
be unable to use its offer to move up the prestige ladder, they will not submit
to this journal unless and until they are serious about publishing in it. This
would dramatically reduce the number of frivolous submissions. 7
The problem, of course, is that what is good in theory can be thwarted in
practice. Professors have already developed numerous tactics for gaming the
current system, 8 and they could easily adapt these existing practices to
contravene a journal’s attempted reform. The professors’ modified tactics
would likely include using a journal’s eight-hour offer to request expedited
reviews simply by misrepresenting the deadline to the higher ranked journals. 9
Similarly, professors have already considered the possibility of shaming and
blackballing student editors for far less than what is proposed in this Essay,
and editors can expect similar retaliation for any attempts to change the status
quo. 10

4

See infra Part I.B.
I use the term “professorial practices” because those who write law review
articles are overwhelmingly professors and aspiring professors. In one recent study,
more than sixty percent of articles were written by authors who were already affiliated
with law schools. See Albert H. Yoon, Editorial Bias in Legal Academia, 5 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 309, 319–20 (2013). Of the remainder, many authors are no doubt
publishing in order to join those ranks. Further, most practitioner-authors who are not
attempting to enter academia simply have no incentive to engage in many of the tactics
described in this Essay. Therefore, although “author” is technically a more accurate
word, I frequently use “professor,” “professoriate,” “professor-types,” or a similar
term to describe those who publish law review articles.
6
See infra Parts II and III.
7
See infra Part II.
8
See infra Part I.B.
9
See infra Part IV.
10
See infra Part V.
5
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Part I of this Essay exposes some professorial tactics related to mass
submissions and, particularly, the expedite game. Part II discusses the eighthour offer as a means of reform, and Part III discusses how such reform could
be implemented. Part IV examines some potential roadblocks standing in the
way of change, and explains how professors would likely attempt to
circumvent a journal’s reform efforts. Part V discusses the potential
repercussions that journal editors could face for changing the current system—
a system that exists to serve the needs of professors and elite journals. The
Conclusion then examines the post-reform world of law review publishing,
after a hypothetical, wide-scale implementation of the eight-hour offer. 11
I. THE LAW REVIEW WAY
From the standpoint of journal editors, the law review publishing system
has at least two significant flaws: mass submissions and the expedited review
process. As explained below, these two flaws negatively impact the editors at
nearly every law journal, albeit to varying degrees. Generally—or at least
within a very wide “relevant range” of journals—editors at lower ranked
journals suffer the greatest impact.
A. Mass Submissions
Once an author finishes an article, the first step in getting that article
published is to select the journals to which it will be submitted. For simplicity,
this Essay will focus only on general interest flagship journals and will ignore
online companion journals and specialty print journals. 12
The relative desirability of the journals is open to some debate. However,
for those authors who are law professors (or hoping to become law professors),
11

The existing law review publishing system has numerous problems, many of
which are only superficially addressed in this Essay. One such problem is the
staggering cost of article submissions—particularly for independent authors. For a
deeper examination of that issue, readers should consult Timothy Lau’s article, A Law
and Economics Critique of the Law Review System, 55 DUQUESNE L. REV.
(forthcoming 2017). In it, Lau examines law review publishing from a systematic
point of view and offers valuable insights for additional reform.
12
Law professors rely heavily on rankings and have thrown themselves into great
turmoil trying to rank specialty journals and online journals relative to flagship
journals. To rank a specialty journal, some professors advocate adding thirty, forty,
or even fifty spots to the journal’s school’s U.S. News & World Report (USN) ranking,
while others recommend avoiding specialty journals entirely. With regard to online
journals, some professors view those at top twenty USN schools as preferable to
flagship journals of lower ranked schools, while others believe that online publications
should not even be counted as publications or, at least, should be listed in a separate
section of the CV.
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journal rank is determined by the U.S. News & World Report (USN) rank of
the law school where the journal is published. 13 In close cases, a law professor
may give the edge to the journal—or, more accurately, the school—with the
better USN peer reputation score, which is a component of its overall USN
rank. As one professor explains, “I’m a fan of peer score from USNWR. It is
the perfect indicator for what we care about: how schools are perceived by law
profs.” 14
There are other ways that professors could evaluate law journals, including
the various Washington and Lee (W&L) journal-ranking methodologies. 15
However, the majority view among law professors is this:
[A]lways go with U.S. News. The reason is that people
reviewing your CV tend to have an idea of where that
journal’s school is ranked; nobody walks around with
encyclopedic knowledge of W&L rankings, nor will most take
the time to look it up. For instance, W&L ranks Lewis and
Clark as #40 (USNEWS ranking = 92) and Alabama as #41
(USNEWS ranking = 28). NOBODY would consider a L&C
placement as even comparable to an Alabama placement,
much less superior. 16
Another professor felt even more strongly about USN’s superiority over
W&L. “DEFINITELY USNWR! The only people who care about the W&L
rankings are individual authors attempting to justify a lower placement (‘but
the journal is ranked #89 on W&L!’).” 17

13

See U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT: EDUCATION, 2018 Best Law Schools,
https://www.usnews.com/best-graduate-schools/top-law-schools
[https://perma.cc/V4EH-H5XL] (last visited Sept. 2, 2017).
14
Persephone, Submission Angsting Spring 2016, PRAWFSBLAWG (Feb. 20, 2016,
4:59 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2016/02/submission-angstingspring-2016/comments/page/4/#comments [https://perma.cc/TA9Y-9A8X].
15
See WASHINGTON AND LEE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW: LAW LIBRARY, Law
Journals: Submissions and Ranking, 2008 – 2015, http://lawlib.wlu.edu/LJ/
[https://perma.cc/98XE-NXL4] (last visited Sept. 2, 2017).
16
AnonProf, Submission Angsting Spring 2017, PRAWFSBLAWG (Feb. 18, 2017,
1:55 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2017/02/submission-angstingspring-2017/comments/page/6/#comments [https://perma.cc/495A-M66P].
17
AnonProf, Submission Angsting Spring 2016, PRAWFSBLAWG (Feb. 14, 2016,
8:45 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2016/02/submission-angstingspring-2016/comments/page/2/#comments [https://perma.cc/F9DM-X389].
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This approach is rather strange, as USN ranks law schools and not
law journals. 18 And some have convincingly argued that USN—“the
surviving rump of an otherwise defunct news magazine”—doesn’t even do
that properly. 19 Nonetheless, in the rankings- and status-obsessed world of
legal academia, USN has become the near-universally accepted method for
ranking law journals. One benefit of using the USN is that it allows professors
to quickly judge and rank each other—both in hiring and promotion
decisions—without having to look at the substance of each other’s work. One
professor explains it this way:
I have chaired my school’s appointments committee several
times, and I talk quite a bit with chairs at other schools. Here's
my opinion—we are impressed by publications that we
immediately know are “good.” . . . Thus, a publication in the
flagship journal in any school in the T30 of U.S. News will
get our attention—probably true of the T50 as well (although
the closer you get to 50, the less that’s the case). From there
on out, your publication very quickly is seen as less
impressive. 20
Professor James Grimmelmann warned that such simple thinking “is a
stinging indictment of how law schools hire and promote. Colleagues who
don’t look past the citation to the substance of an article when making such
decisions are shirking their responsibilities as scholars and members of a
learned profession . . . .” 21 Nonetheless, this warning has largely fallen on deaf
ears. Professors love both heuristics and rankings, and the practice of judging
a colleague by the journal in which he or she has published is deeply ingrained
in the legal academy. Therefore, it is likely here to stay.
For the practitioner-author who has no desire to become a professor,
additional factors may come into play when deciding between journals. These
18
See Lau, supra note 11 (“[L]egal academics are taking the rankings far beyond
their intended use, and essentially are ranking journals based on factors that have little
to do with the journals themselves.”).
19
Paul Campos, Scenes from the Class Struggle, INSIDE THE LAW SCHOOL SCAM
(Feb. 29, 2012), http://insidethelawschoolscam.blogspot.com/2012/02/scenes-fromclass-struggle.html [https://perma.cc/3UQ9-CWFW].
20
anonprof, Submission Angsting Spring 2017, PRAWFSBLAWG (Mar. 3, 2017,
8:49 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2017/02/submission-angstingspring-2017/comments/page/14/#comments.
21
James Grimmelmann, Exploding Offers from Law Reviews: A New Trend?,
(Oct.
20,
2015,
9:43
AM),
PRAWFSBLAWG
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2015/10/exploding-offers-from-lawreviews-a-new-trend.html [https://perma.cc/D4DW-XRKA].
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might include how quickly a particular journal will publish the article or
whether the journal’s name is recognizable to judges, lawyers, and clients—
three groups that are typically unaware of the USN rankings. 22 But these
deviations from the norm are not enough to upset the USN applecart in any
significant way. That is, the Duke Law Journal is better than the Arizona Law
Review which is better than the Louisiana Law Review, and so on.
While every professor wants to publish in the highly ranked journals, these
journals can only publish a very small fraction of the articles they receive. For
example, “[t]he Southern California Law Review receives thousands of
unsolicited manuscripts each year. From this pool, we ultimately select about
12 articles for publication.” 23 And this leads to the problem of mass
submissions. 24 Even though (and because) every professor wants to publish in
a top journal, it would be unwise to submit only to such journals. There are
two reasons for this.
First, the overwhelming majority of professors will be rejected by the top
journals, yet many of them will want to publish their work somewhere—more
on that later. Therefore, they must submit more broadly than just the elite
journals. And second, although a handful of professors will ultimately win the
publication jackpot and receive an offer from a top journal, 25 the most common
way to achieve that is first to obtain an offer from a lower ranked journal and
then send an expedited review request to the top journal which then reviews
the article and eventually offers to publish it. This expedite process is the
subject of the next Part.
For these reasons, it is very common for a professor to submit his or her
article to one hundred or more different journals. For example, in response to
an author who reported submitting only to eighty-five journals, one professor
advised, “[i]n my opinion, submitting to just the top 85 journals is insufficient.
I would recommend at least 150 journals.” 26

22

As an extreme example, I am highly confident that most judges, lawyers, and
clients where I practice law in the Midwest would assume that a publication in the
Michigan State Law Review (currently USN 96) is better than a publication in the
Emory Law Journal (currently USN 22).
23
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW: SUBMISSIONS: Article Submissions,
http://lawreview.usc.edu/submissions/ [https://perma.cc/7MC5-7LDR] (last visited
Sept. 2, 2017).
24
For an explanation of the structural reasons for mass submissions, see Lau,
supra note 11.
25
What constitutes a “top journal” is relative. One artificial category is the USN
top fourteen, or T-14 for short. Other cutoffs bandied about by the professoriate
include T-20, T-25, T-50, T-60, T-80, and T-100.
26
Been There, Submission Angsting Spring 2016, PRAWFSBLAWG (Mar. 15, 2016,
8:14 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2016/02/submission-angstingspring-2016/comments/page/10/#comments [https://perma.cc/7WKD-H6V9].
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This mass submission strategy causes several problems.
Most
significantly and obviously, “[m]assive simultaneous submission is a
nightmare for overworked students, undercuts the quality of the review they
are able to give, and injects a large quantity of randomness into the article
placement process.” 27 In addition, while this mass submission strategy is
currently necessary for an author to get the “best” placement, it comes at a
financial cost.
While many of the USN top one hundred journals accept submissions via
email, most require or at least “strongly prefer” submissions through one of
the online systems, Scholastica or Expresso. 28 Journals probably prefer this,
in part, to help manage the massive number of articles they receive each year.
From an author’s perspective, the cost of submitting a manuscript to one
journal through Scholastica is currently $6.50, and the cost through Expresso
is $3.10. 29 However, from the standpoint of some authors, while these
submission systems may offer a couple of conveniences, there are no real
benefits over a simple, cost-free email.
The costs of submissions add up quickly. Assume that a very costconscious author submits to one hundred journals before eventually receiving
his or her first offer. Also assume that twenty-five of those journals are
indifferent to the method of submission and will gladly accept emailed articles.
Of the remaining seventy-five, perhaps twenty-five will accept submissions
through the less expensive Expresso system, leaving fifty submissions through
Scholastica. Under these very conservative assumptions, the cost-conscious
author would incur submission costs of over $400 for a single article.
As Timothy Lau explains, this is a staggering cost on a per article basis,
making it difficult for many practitioners, law clerks, and other independent
writers to fully participate in the law review publishing process. 30 And even
for professors who are able to shift submission costs to their employer-law
schools, the law schools may also be shifting the costs: “a lot of people that

27

Grimmelmann, supra note 21.
See, e.g., GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW: MANUSCRIPT SUBMISSIONS:
Scholastica Submissions, http://www.gwlr.org/submissions/ [https://perma.cc/X9XCGBQD] (last visited Sept. 2, 2017).
29
Many journals have switched from Expresso to the far more expensive
Scholastica, possibly, some have argued, to discourage submissions. Unfortunately,
as discussed in the following paragraphs and in the next Part, while higher costs
discourage submissions from serious authors with limited resources, they will not
discourage frivolous submissions from professors—many of whom do not pay for
their own submissions and have an incentive to submit even to journals in which they
would never accept an offer of publication.
30
See Lau, supra note 11.
28
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submit . . . aren’t paying their own bills. Students’ tuition money is funding
all or most of their submissions.” 31
Worse yet, the $400-per-article figure cited above is probably low. In
response to a question about the costs of submitting a single article, one
professor wrote:
I think I have racked up about $650 in submission fees which
fortunately my school pays for. . . . [L]aw faculties are not
price sensitive since our employer pays the fee and we have
every incentive to maximize the number of submissions since
for many of us our annual compensation is impacted by article
placement. 32
As the above comment indicates, the mass submission system does have a
very significant benefit for professors: if one submits to enough journals, one
will usually receive an offer of publication. Unfortunately for journal editors,
as difficult as it is for them to read, evaluate, manage, and respond to these
mass submissions, what follows next is even worse.
B. Expedited Review
When professors submit their article to a law journal, they are not doing
so with the goal of actually publishing in that journal. Rather, they want to
receive an offer they can then use to send expedited review requests to higher
ranked journals. And sometimes there are multiple rounds of expedites. One
first-time author described it this way in the course of posting a question:
I’m facing my third expedite (T100 to T50 to T30). From a
courtesy/professionalism perspective, is there any limit to
how many times I can or should use the full week [of the offer
window] to try to go up the food chain? I think I'm playing
the game exactly right, but I want to make sure I am not
missing any downside. It feels weirdly exploitative. 33
31

YesterdayIKilledAMammoth,
Submission
Angsting
Spring
2017,
(Feb.
26,
2017,
12:10
AM),
PRAWFSBLAWG
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2017/02/submission-angsting-spring2017/comments/page/10/#comments [https://perma.cc/P872-986T].
32
Anonymouse, Submission Angsting Spring 2017, PRAWFSBLAWG (Feb. 28,
2017,
9:57
AM)
(emphasis
added),
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2017/02/submission-angsting-spring2017/comments/page/11/#comments [https://perma.cc/K8UG-ZGQV].
33
AngstingAnon, Submission Angsting Spring 2017, PRAWFSBLAWG (Mar. 3,
2017, 11:18 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2017/02/submission-
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A seasoned professor reassured him: “that’s right—that’s how the game is
played. Keep on expediting up! Journals don’t like it, but they expect it . . .
.” 34 Another professor described the significance of the expedite process: “if
by mid-season (meaning, around late February) you’re not in the expedite
cycle your season is pretty much doomed . . . . By that time, most T50 journals
are so overwhelmed with expedites that they have no time for anything else.” 35
Similarly, another professor wrote that “a lot of the ‘better’ journals will not
even look at an article . . . until they receive an expedite request on that
particular piece.” 36
Given this state of affairs, the first offer of publication is so important that
some professors take very creative measures to obtain it; then, once obtained,
it allows them to set the expedite machinery in motion. For example, one
author reports that “profs submit to their own students, creating an indefensible
conflict of interests, just to [receive an offer and] get into the expedite
pipeline.” 37 Law professor Ken Levy elaborates:
[S]tudents feel obliged to accept submissions by their own
professors. This much is forgivable, I suppose. What is less
forgivable is the professors’ willingness to put them in this
position to begin with. They are in effect compelling the
students to [offer to] publish their work, no matter how weak
it may be . . . . 38
angsting-spring-2017/comments/page/14/#comments
[https://perma.cc/Z6Y9QUUK].
34
Angstingagain, Submission Angsting Spring 2017, PRAWFSBLAWG (Mar. 3,
2017, 11:45 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2017/02/submissionangsting-spring-2017/comments/page/14/#comments [https://perma.cc/T8UN-482N].
35
2Dings, Submission Angsting Spring 2017, PRAWFSBLAWG (Feb. 16, 2017, 7:43
AM),
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2017/02/submission-angstingspring-2017/comments/page/3/ - comments [https://perma.cc/LFD3-5NL4].
36
Anon, Exploding Offers from Law Reviews: A New Trend?, PRAWFSBLAWG
(Oct.
20,
2015,
9:47
PM),
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2015/10/exploding-offers-from-lawreviews-a-new-trend.html [https://perma.cc/B5D8-LYGJ].
37
YesterdayIKilledAMammoth,
Submission
Angsting
Spring
2017,
(Feb.
15,
2017,
5:19
PM),
PRAWFSBLAWG
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2017/02/submission-angsting-spring2017/comments/page/3/#comments [https://perma.cc/HW3X-V22W].
38
Ken Levy, US Law Review’s Dirty Game: Review by Student, TIMES HIGHER
EDUCATION (Nov. 12, 2015), https://www.timeshighereducation.com/opinion/us-lawreviews-dirty-game-peer-review-by-student. Often, the article is indeed “weak,” and
if the professor cannot get another offer in the expedite process, the offering law
review is stuck with it. See Albert H. Yoon, supra note 5, at 333 (“[I]nsider authors

2017

LAW REVIEW PUBLISHING

157

The anonymous commenter, above, also revealed another publication
tactic. “Other profs call their students who are editors and shill for a friend’s
article” 39—a favor that could, in theory, be returned at a future date if the
professor currently doing the shilling ever has difficulty placing his or her own
article. One professor openly described and defended the practice this way:
I have in the past, and likely would in the future, recommend
pieces to our editors when I know they are in the pile. . . . I
don’t say “you should publish this,” but I do say “here is what
I liked about it and how I think it fits into the larger
literature.” 40
Whether this particular practice is appropriate is the subject of much
debate. But what is not debatable is that, much like the ability to shift
submission costs to their employer-law schools (and from there, possibly to
the tuition-paying students), this practice gives some professors a tremendous
advantage over practitioner-authors and even over less well-connected
professors. 41
More troubling yet, some authors go to even greater lengths to get into the
expedite game. Rather than asking for an offer from their own students or
relying on other professors at other schools to recommend the article to their
students, some—hopefully a small minority—simply fabricate an offer out of
whole cloth. Professor Shima Baradaran Baughman urges her fellow
professors to “[b]e honest with your expedites” and reports:
I spoke with some editors at a T-10 law review that had a black
list of authors that had faked expedites in the past that they

are less successful at leveraging offers from their own law reviews because their
articles were qualitatively weaker that what their law reviews accept from outside
authors . . . .”).
39
YesterdayIKilledAMammoth, supra note 37.
40
CBR, Submission Angsting Spring 2017, PRAWFSBLAWG (Feb. 16, 2017, 2:09
PM),
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2017/02/submission-angstingspring-2017/comments/page/4/#comments [https://perma.cc/W6LP-NP2C].
41
This desire to build and use connections could explain the so-called vanity
footnote. Look at any article in any top journal, and you’ll likely see the professor
gushing thanks to a dozen or more individuals and, additionally, to the organizers of
numerous workshops. This also gives some indication that the true cost of churning
out a professor-written law review article goes well beyond the professor’s time and
the $650 needed to submit the article through Scholastica and Expresso. Conference
fees, lodging, and travel no doubt add tremendously to the cost of this status-obsessed
endeavor.
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passed on [to] their faculty and new editors. They had added
an additional author this year because the particular author
had faked an expedite from one top law review to another and
the senior articles editors at those schools happened to be good
friends. Ouch. 42

Ouch, indeed. However, the professor-types actually have mixed
views on this practice of fabricating offers. One thought that blacklisting by
the law journals was very troubling, potentially unfair, and simply too harsh.
“Some people make bad decisions. It ain’t murder, or even jaywalking,
really.” 43 Another disagreed. “The list of blacklisted authors is correct—these
miscreants [i.e., the authors who fake expedite] need to be punished and being
blacklisted is most appropriate.” 44 Yet another performed a law-andeconomics analysis and, given the relatively mild punishment of blacklisting,
concluded that from a risk-reward perspective, “any rational lower tiered
author or those without any letterhead should ALWAYS make up fake
expedites to the top journals.” 45
In any case, assuming a professor obtains an actual offer—whether from
his or her own students, with the assistance of a friend at another school, and/or
because of the article’s quality or appeal—the offering journal will usually
allow a substantial period of time in which the professor may accept the offer.
In my own experience, I have received acceptance deadlines ranging from one
day to two weeks, but one week is by far the most common. This one-week
window, in essence, provides an author the opportunity to trade up to a higher
ranked journal via the expedited review process.
Some professors are so obsessed with the rankings game that they will
attempt to trade up even one or two spots in the USN hierarchy—if for no other
reason than to extend the expedite process and keep their article in play at the
42
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top journals just a little bit longer. 46 An incredibly common practice—but an
amazing one, at least to me—is to ask the offering journal for an extension of
the offer’s deadline for the specific and stated purpose of pursuing better
journals.
In general, the behavior exhibited during the expedite process would be
unimaginable in nearly any other context. The obvious and often-used analogy
is that participating in the expedite process is like agreeing to go to prom with
someone on a contingent basis—that is, I’ll go with you only if I don’t find a
more attractive date by, say, the Tuesday before the dance. Calling on Monday
night to get an extension until, say, Thursday is just layering a second insult
on top of the first.
But here the journal editors must share blame. It is their practice of
holding offers open for one week or more, and then often agreeing to extend
deadlines even further, that enables the expedite system to function. 47
Essentially, the one-week offer (and extensions thereof) turns the lower ranked
journals into “uncompensated screening staff” for the more prestigious
journals. 48 That is, the lower ranked journals are the grease which allows the
class-based machinery to operate. Professor Andrew Chongseh Kim described
the negative impact of this system on an actual journal as follows:
If we [professors] get a better offer before deadline, we drop
the original offer like a bad habit and hopefully expedite our
way all the way to the top. The practice is often tough for
lower ranked journals [that] have to scramble to find new
articles. . . . Over the course of a month, the [editors at one
journal] had made fifteen separate offers to authors to fill one
slot, and each time the author declined their offer after
expediting upwards. 49

46
See Joseph Scott Miller, The Immorality of Requesting Expedited Review, 21
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (some professors will even make
“sideways moves to journals that are not more desirable but that provide a laterexpiring offer, and thus supply more time in the notional trading pit.”).
47
See Joseph Scott Miller, A Modest Proposal for Expediting Manuscript
Selection at Less Prestigious Law Reviews (UGA Legal Studies Research Paper No.
2016-26), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2811817 [https://perma.cc/YH8N-7YHS]
(arguing that “the journal obtains no benefit from assisting the author in his or her
efforts to shop the piece to more prestigious reviews”).
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And if this isn’t bad enough, there is an even bigger kick in the head
awaiting the editors at some law journals. Some law professors are so status
conscious that they may ultimately reject a journal’s offer even if they fail to
receive a better offer from their expedited review requests. In other words,
some professors believe that non-publication is preferable to publication by
the offering journal.
For example, one professor cautioned aspiring scholars not to “‘get it in
print’ somewhere that is going to hurt you. There are some journals where
you’d be better off to not publish at all than to . . . have placed a piece there.” 50
Others have offered specifics on how to identify such journals. One professor
warned would-be academics that “a placement outside the T100 is worse than
having not published at all.” 51 Others are even more conscious of these class
distinctions. One would-be professor reported that “I have received advice
that I should not accept any offer outside of T-60, as doing so could hurt my
chances once (or if) I actually go on the job market.” 52
As a lawyer who writes about matters of importance to other practicing
lawyers, I find this thought process difficult to grasp. I once even passed on a
USN top fifty journal offer in favor of a lower journal with an earlier
publication date, thus allowing me to get my work into the hands of my
colleagues and in front of trial judges nearly a year sooner. Conversely, a
professor’s view that his or her work is, in some cases, best left unpublished
seriously calls into question the value of that work. 53
More specifically, some law professors find themselves trapped in an
uncomfortable area between lawyer and scholar: they have never (or barely)
practiced law, yet also lack formal, advanced training in an academic
discipline. 54 The result is that neither practicing lawyers nor true academics
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little or no legal practice experience. Further, for those professors who have such
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have much interest in the subject matter of their work. Even their fellow law
professors may have little interest. The following lament nicely captures this
predicament, which is perhaps what drives some law professors’
preoccupation with class, rank, and prestige over substance:
Look, the sad truth is rarely will people read your work, but
many in your career will read your CV. They’ll look over
your publications and they will absolutely use your
placements as a proxy for how good a scholar you are. When
it’s tenure time, you’re [sic] faculty (whether they admit it or
not) will be considering your placements . . . . [And] we all
realize that, given the proliferation of journals today, almost
anything anyone writes can get published somewhere.55
Yet the professors’ obsession with prestige does not prevent them from
using the “proliferation of journals”—those outside the “T100” or “T-60,”
depending on the particular professor—to obtain that first offer which, in turn,
will be used solely for purposes of expediting. One professor explained, “I
don’t think it’s unethical to submit to places you wouldn’t accept. Does it suck
for the students, yes. But it is a known component of our publication system
that relies heavily on expedites.” 56
Until Spring 2017, I certainly did not know this practice was a “component
of our publishing system.” (Another known, but less common, component is
reneging on an agreement after having accepted the offer.) 57 Nonetheless,
another professor agreed, and placed blame for this practice—i.e., submitting
to journals where the author would not publish under any circumstances—on
the higher ranked journals. “I too submit to journals I would never accept.

of any kind. See Paul Campos, Legal Academia and the Blindness of the Elites, 37
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Given how the system works (i.e., many journals will not look at your piece
until they get an expedite), I think you’re foolish not to.” 58
One professor reported engaging in this practice on a very wide scale,
stating that he or she “placed in a T30 journal—after submitting to 150
journals, most of which I wouldn’t have accepted . . . .” 59 Another professor
specifically advised: “Regardless of whether you’d publish in the journal,
submit to the top 100 . . . .” 60 And another reported that he or she recently
“[g]ot three offers including top 80, but decided to withdraw” the article
instead of publishing it with any of the offering journals. 61
Although lower ranked journals are hit the hardest by this practice, even
highly ranked journals are not immune. A newer professor was presumably
serious when he or she asked this question: “If most of the other law reviews
still have not responded [to my expedite requests] by next Wednesday—which
is likely, given how early it is [in the submission season]—should I just let my
T30 LR offer lapse and take my chances?”62
After being repeatedly victimized by such prestige-driven tactics, one
lower ranked journal had enough and temporarily instituted an extreme
measure that sent some law professors into a state of emotional turmoil: the
journal made its publication offers on a first-come, first-serve basis. That is,
once an offer is accepted by one of the authors to whom it was extended, the
other offers for that publication slot would be withdrawn from those who were
too slow on the draw—that is, too status conscious—to quickly accept. 63
In light of this, one professor observed that the current system of mass
submissions and expedites is “great for journals at the top but bad for journals
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at the bottom.” 64 Of course, it’s great for professors, too. This same professor
realized that, if enough lower ranked journals got fed up and started taking
similarly drastic measures, “it could destabilize the entire, highly flawed, law
review system that is central to all of our careers.” 65 Destabilizing “the entire,
highly flawed, law review system” is precisely what the next Part examines.
II. THE EIGHT-HOUR OFFER
As explained above, the current system forces editors—particularly those
at the lower ranked journals—to spend a tremendous amount of time and effort
reading, evaluating, and making offers for articles they will never have the
opportunity to publish. In addition, there are substantial financial costs for
authors to submit articles to the journals—costs which, in many cases, will be
paid for by tuition-paying students (including, ironically, the student editors
who are forced to read the mass submissions that generated the costs in the
first place).
Also as explained above, it is the journals’ one-week offer window (along
with extensions thereof) that enables this class-based system to function. In
theory, then, one solution to this problem is for a journal—regardless of its
rank—to change to an eight-hour offer window. 66 Or, as James Grimmelmann
has argued, “[a]ll journals should make short exploding offers.” 67 And
because an eight-hour offer window is in each journal’s individual best interest
regardless of how long other journals keep their offers open, any journal that
implements this policy would—again, at least in theory—reap immediate
benefits.
Admittedly, as the next Part demonstrates, professors may be able to
circumvent such a reform—particularly if it is adopted by only a small number
of non-elite journals. But for now, consider how such a policy would
theoretically work if adopted by only a single journal, “Journal 100.” (This
example could easily be applied to a journal ranked in the top fifty, or seventyfifth, or into the triple digits for that matter.) Hundreds of professors currently
submit to Journal 100 for the primary, and sometimes the sole, purpose of
obtaining an offer to use in the expedite process. The result is that the editors
of Journal 100 will be making offers to professors who will not accept them.
64
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But what if Journal 100 was able to communicate to professors, before the
submission season began, that its offers would come with an eight-hour
acceptance window that will not be extended under any circumstances? For
example, if Journal 100 makes an offer on a Tuesday evening, the professor
would have until 5:00 p.m. on Wednesday to accept it, or the offer will expire.
Allowing eight business hours ensures that the professor has enough time to
check his or her email and respond to the offer, but not much else.
Assuming that this policy is effectively communicated to professors
before the submission season, would professors still submit to Journal 100?
There would be no incentive to submit to this journal merely to obtain an offer
to use in the expedite process, as eight hours is not enough time for other
journals to conduct an expedited review. Knowing this upfront, professors
would only submit to this journal after they have been rejected by, or are tired
of waiting for, the higher ranked journals. That is, professors would only
submit to Journal 100 if and when they are serious about publishing in Journal
100.
If adopted on a wide scale, the eight-hour offer would effectively turn the
system from a bottom-up process to a top-down process. Currently, lower
ranked journals screen articles for more prestigious journals, which then select
the articles they want to publish. With an eight-hour offer window, however,
the more prestigious journals would first select the articles they want to publish
(without the benefit of receiving expedited review requests), and the lower
ranked journals would publish the articles that remain. The end result,
however, would be the same. The only difference is whether an article moves
upstream (via expedited review) or downstream before eventually finding its
home. 68
It is true that Journal 100 would receive far fewer submissions if professors
knew the journal would only hold the offer open for eight business hours. But
that is the point of this proposed reform. Journal 100 does not want to be
overwhelmed with reading, evaluating, and making offers on articles that it
has no chance to publish (often because professors have, deceptively, first
ruled out the journal and then submitted to it). Instead, Journal 100 would
receive far fewer submissions, but would have much more time to spend on
each submission and, more importantly, would have a much better chance of
actually publishing those articles for which it does make offers.
And there is a potential, additional benefit—though not one that would
accrue unless the eight-hour policy was widely adopted. If enough journals
moved to an eight-hour window, aggregate submission costs would fall
dramatically. The reason is that professors would only submit to the journals
in which they truly would be willing to publish, and mass submissions would
end. Granted, the professors who eventually published in Journal 100 would
68
See Miller, supra note 46 (explaining that the system is a “self-interested
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incur the same submission costs on a piecemeal basis working down the USN
ranks, rather than incurring them all upfront in a mass submission designed to
work up the USN ranks. But the professors who published in the higher ranked
journals would actually spend less, as they would not continue to submit down
the ranks after receiving their offer. Therefore, if the eight-hour offer system
were widely adopted, no professor would spend more, but most would spend
less, to publish an article. 69
Many law professors complain about the current law review publishing
system including, oddly, the features that benefit them the most: mass
submissions and expedited review. But such complaints are merely knee-jerk
reactions to the numerous rejections that all authors inevitably receive when
submitting on such a wide scale. As one professor explained, “the angsting
comes from how rejection-filled publishing is—even when you’re successful.
. . . If you end up publishing with a very good law review like the Wisconsin
Law Review, your cycle is likely illustrated by rejections from nearly all
journals ranked higher than Wisconsin.” 70 Another professor added that “[t]he
process is so bruising because, even if you end up getting a great placement
like Wisconsin . . . you’ll [also] get rejected from many, many journals ranked
below Wisconsin.” 71
Despite the angst associated with the current system, professors would
complain far more loudly if mass submissions and expedited reviews were
replaced with a universal, eight-hour offer window. With an eight-hour offer,
professors would no longer be able to submit to one hundred or more journals
in a mindless pursuit of hyper-technical, but illusory, prestige-based
distinctions. For example, a professor who submits to the top thirty journals
and receives an eight-hour offer from journal number thirty would, as a
practical matter, be forced to accept that offer without the luxury of expediting
to journal number twenty-five, or to the so-called top fourteen.
The loss of these artificial and meaningless distinctions (e.g., “T-14”
versus “T-25” and “T-50” versus “T-60”) would also force law professors to
judge each other not on the precise USN rank of the law school that houses the
journal in which an article was published, but instead on the substance of each
other’s work. Eliminating such a time-saving heuristic would also not sit well
with the professoriate. But this is a heuristic they should immediately abandon
69
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regardless of whether the current system is reformed. The reason is that, on
the one hand, professors judge each other by their journal placements. But on
the other hand, many professors simultaneously declare that “[l]aw students
are utterly unqualified to judge legal scholarship.” 72 Professors could resolve
these irreconcilable positions by simply judging one another on their work,
rather than their journal covers.
The truly elite USN journals would also like to preserve the status quo. In
the past, when lower ranked journals have used exploding offers, a group of
elite journals promoted a policy through a joint letter, ostensibly for the greater
good, where signatory journals committed to holding offers open for a full
seven days. 73 The reality is that a one-week offer window benefits the elite
journals—in addition to other benefits, it gives them time to conduct expedited
reviews and pickoff articles from lower ranked journals—which might explain
why they promoted the policy in the first place. 74
And while elite journal editors benefit from the expedited review system,
the “[s]tudent editors at less prestigious journals suffer not only a steady
diversion of labor to others’ benefit, but also the demoralization of sowing
again and again where they will not reap.” 75 In short, whenever the elite law
journals do one thing, it is often a good idea for the non-elites to do—or at
least strongly consider doing—the opposite.
III. IMPLEMENTATION
The previous Part discussed the impact of an eight-hour offer window if
adopted by a single school and also if adopted more broadly. For now, we will
return to our discussion of one journal—Journal 100—and how it might
implement such a policy.
To begin, Journal 100 would have to give adequate notice of the policy
before law professors submit their articles. The current system of mass
submissions and expedited review is deep-rooted; in fairness, it would be quite
a shock to submit an article expecting business as usual only to receive an offer
that remains open for eight business hours. Unfortunately, Scholastica and
Expresso do not appear to allow for such notice—other than Scholastica’s
72
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generic (and often ignored) recommendation that authors check each journal’s
guidelines and Expresso’s text box that usually indicates when a journal will
open for submissions.
One way to provide sufficient advance notice is for Journal 100 to consider
closing its Scholastica and Expresso accounts—at least for one submission
season—to instead accept submissions by email or its online system. This
would prevent professors from mindlessly clicking the journal cover (on
Scholastica) or the journal name (on Expresso), and would instead force them
to visit Journal 100’s website which would provide adequate notice of its eighthour policy. Further, word of this new policy would quickly spread among the
professoriate—a group that monitors the smallest disturbances in the status
quo and quickly communicates them through its numerous blogs. 76 Journal
100’s notice on its website could read as follows:
Journal 100 is pleased to accept, via email, unsolicited articles
and essays for publication. The Journal is happy to consider
manuscripts that have been submitted simultaneously to other
journals; exclusive submission is not required. However, if
The Journal decides to extend an offer of publication, that
offer will be held open for only eight business hours, i.e., until
5:00 PM CST the business day following the evening that the
offer was extended. If the author does not accept by that time,
the offer expires without further notice. The Journal does not
grant deadline extensions.
The website should also give some indication of the purpose behind the
policy. For example:
Journal 100 has adopted this policy in response to the
problems of mass submissions and expedited review. We
understand that an author to whom The Journal extends an
offer may receive other offers within the eight hour window.
Therefore, receiving an offer from The Journal does not
obligate the author to accept it. However, due to the short
time frame for acceptance (eight business hours), we
recommend that authors not submit their work to us until they
would give strong consideration to accepting an offer to
publish in The Journal.
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From the author’s perspective, it would be very helpful to provide
additional information on the website. This should be updated regularly, and
may include the following:
Authors should not submit their work until March 1, 2018, the
day that The Journal will begin reviewing submissions. The
Journal will review submissions on a rolling basis until all
available publication slots are filled. The Journal publishes
four issues per year—two during the Fall and two during the
Spring—and generally publishes three articles per issue.
Please check this website frequently for updates about the
availability of open publication slots.
Shortly after an author accepts an offer to publish in The
Journal, he or she will be required to sign a publication
agreement. The publication agreement, which will be
customized for each individual author’s name, manuscript
title, and the anticipated volume and issue, is provided below
in PDF format for review by prospective authors.
For journals that already accept submissions via email—many do; some
exclusively so 77—eliminating Scholastica and Expresso would not be difficult.
Further, even for journals that currently rely on these systems to manage their
submissions, the eight-hour offer window is designed to reduce the volume of
submissions—most notably, the articles that the journal would never have a
realistic chance at publishing anyway. Therefore, the journal that implements
this policy will have less of a need for the submission management features of
the two systems, and could easily survive without them for one submission
season. And given the exorbitant fees that Scholastica charges authors to
submit—currently $6.50 to send one article to one journal—the change to costfree email would be welcomed by some authors. 78
IV. ROADBLOCKS TO REFORM
Unfortunately, there are many things that could stifle Journal 100’s reform
efforts or might even prevent such efforts from getting off the ground. First,
journal editors are one-and-done; that is, they are editors for only one year, and
by the time they learn the ropes of the law review publishing business they are
moving on (hopefully) to real business and their first legal jobs. They simply
77
See, e.g., UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE: PUBLICATIONS: LAW REVIEW: Article
Submission, http://law.ubalt.edu/academics/publications/lawreview/submission.cfm
[https://perma.cc/B3TU-G8JD] (last visited Sept. 16, 2017) (“To submit articles for
review, please email your article, a cover letter, and curriculum vitae or resume.”).
78
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may not have sufficient motivation—understandably so—to reform the
system. 79
Second, if Journal 100 did institute an eight-hour offer policy, and if
professors acted as they theoretically should, Journal 100 might receive its
submissions later in the season. This could interfere with the journal editors’
other obligations, including preparing for final exams. In this case, journal
editors may wish to consider the slightly more complex reform suggested by
Professor Joseph Scott Miller, which includes “three integrated, data-driven
steps,” and involves identifying, by institutional affiliation, which professorauthors are most likely to accept an offer of publication. 80
Third, and most significantly, even assuming that professors visit Journal
100’s website and read the eight-hour offer policy before submitting, they may
simply decide to thwart Journal 100’s attempted reform effort. That is, even
knowing that an offer would be held open for only eight hours, a professor
may submit his or her article, obtain an offer, and still use it in the expedited
review process. How could a professor do this given that eight hours is not
enough time for another journal to conduct an expedited review? Quite
simply, nothing prevents the professor from misrepresenting the offer deadline
to other journals, as letting the real deadline lapse does not matter when the
professor had no intention of ever publishing with Journal 100 in the first
place.
This idea should not be surprising, as some authors have reportedly
committed the more serious deception of fabricating the underlying offer on
which the expedite request is based. 81 Further, some professors who receive
legitimate offers already alter their deadlines for purposes of expediting. One
professor explains that, “[w]hen I have had an expedite expire without another
offer, I have gone back in to [S]cholastica [and] put in a new really long
expedite deadline . . . .” 82 Unilaterally extending the deadline of the (nowexpired) offer allows the professor to remain in the expedite game, even
though he or she no longer has a pending offer and arguably should be removed
from consideration. The professor even reports that “I’ve done that twice now
I think and both times I’ve received subsequent higher offers . . . .” 83
The important point, of course, is that if a professor can unilaterally extend
the offering journal’s deadline after the offer has expired, nothing would
prevent him or her from unilaterally extending the deadline in the first place,
before making expedited review requests. Journal 100’s eight-hour offer
79

In this case, a much simpler reform is to open for submissions later in the
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would then become a one-week offer (or longer) for the creative professor’s
intents and purposes.
For this reason, the eight-hour reform would be far more effective if
implemented by a journal prestigious enough that most professors would
accept the journal’s offer if it was the only one they received. For example,
under the current system, if a professor receives an offer from a USN top sixty
journal and fails to receive a better offer when expediting, the majority of such
professors would accept the top sixty offer. Therefore, most professors who
would submit to a USN top sixty journal, knowing that any offer would be
held open for only eight hours, would accept such an offer rather than
artificially extend the deadline to gamble on a better outcome in the expedite
process.84
Alternatively, if a journal is lower in the USN pecking order, the eighthour reform could also be effective if it was adequately publicized. A journal
could, for example, do the opposite of what the elite schools did in their joint
statement on offer length. 85 Rather than announcing a one-week offer policy
ostensibly for the greater good, a journal could announce its eight-hour offer
policy in response to the numerous problems that plague law review
publishing, including mass submissions, the expedited review process run
amok, and the deceptive tactics employed by some professors.
Making this known through a public statement would do at least two
things. First, it would probably win the journal some respect from the sizeable
minority that is disgusted by the mindless pursuit of prestige in legal academia.
And second, it would alert the higher ranked journals to the eight-hour policy.
Then, if a higher ranked journal were to receive a professor’s expedited review
request based on an offer from the lower ranked, signatory journal, its editors
would know that the offer—or at least the deadline—on which the expedite
request is based is not genuine. Hopefully, if the editors of the higher ranked
journals knew this, they would not tolerate such deception. 86
Theoretically, if a large majority of journals moved to an eight-hour offer
policy, the practice of expediting would grind to a halt. Smaller scale
implementations would, however, be vulnerable to abuse by prestige-driven
professors. But the amount of abuse would negatively correlate with the scope
of the reform: the greater number of journals or the more prestigious the
journal(s) that move to an eight-hour offer window, fewer and fewer professors
would attempt to game the system. If the Ohio State Law Journal, by itself,
84
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adopted the eight-hour offer, few professors would fabricate a longer deadline
in order to jump into the expedite game. Unfortunately, if the Ohio Northern
University Law Review, by itself, adopted the eight-hour offer, the reform
could yield some positive results—and certainly some respect—for the
journal, but would not completely foreclose professorial abuse.
V. BLACKBALLING IS A TWO-WAY STREET
Law professor angst reaches its peak sometime between mid-February and
mid-March, the heart of the law review submission season. One illustration of
this is a professor who sniped at his colleagues on the PrawfsBlawg angsting
thread: “I’m forever baffled by the lack of reading comprehension skills
displayed on this board—a board that, I thought, was populated by law
professors. Please reread my post.” 87 He or she then went on to restate the
technical distinction made earlier between submission strategies designed to
win a “T14” placement versus those calculated to win a less prestigious “top
20 or 25” placement. 88 His or her colleagues’ failure to catch this subtle
distinction in the earlier post is what caused the distress.
For a more relevant example, consider this: some law journals often
receive more than one thousand submissions to fill only a few publication
slots. Many journal editors, understandably, don’t take the time to respond
with a rejection email to each and every professor who submits an article. But
professors know full well that when they don’t receive the nice thank-you-forsubmitting email, a journal’s failure to respond means it is not interested in
publishing the article. (Once again, the prom analogy is helpful: when your
first choice for the dance won’t respond to you, the answer is “no.”)
Nonetheless, although some professors complain about receiving the
impersonal, standard rejection email, others complain when they don’t receive
one. 89 Some even contend, rather ironically, that the failure to send a rejection
email is evidence of the students’ “solipsistic narcissism” 90 and constitutes
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unethical behavior. 91 One professor even hinted at potentially blackballing the
student editors down the road.
The discussion began with a complaint that “Harvard used to be a prompt
and reliable reject, but has been a non-responder in the last couple of
seasons.” 92 One professor suggested they could obtain the much desired
rejection emails from Harvard and other schools “by simply sending e-mails
to any journal that has not responded to us. That way, they will desire to send
rejections simply to avoid being swamped by e-mails. Just my 2-cents.” 93
That advice certainly isn’t worth “2-cents,” but it likely wouldn’t cause
the student editors any serious harm, either. So another professor ramped it up
a level: “if enough submitters make it known that editors who don’t act
professionally enough may have it held against them in the future (e.g., VAP
hiring decisions), that might scare them into doing their job.” 94
Similarly, recall the earlier discussion about the journal that made fifteen
offers, still couldn’t fill its single publication slot, and therefore decided to
make first-come-first-serve, exploding-type offers to induce an acceptance.
The professor who wrote about that incident believed the journal editors made
a “creative mistake,” as such offers could “discourage authors from submitting
to [that] journal[] in the first place.” 95
To begin, this professor clearly did not grasp that, from the standpoint of
the editors, “discourag[ing] authors from submitting” is the goal. But then,
and more to the point, the professor stated that, because the journal’s faculty
advisors “say this will not be their standard practice going forward, I think it
makes sense to keep the names of the journals out of this blog, and the
comments, for now.” 96 But he did not discourage disclosure via other means:
“I won’t delete any comments that offer to share the names offline.” 97
91
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What professors forget is that blackballing and shaming can work both
ways. For example, the professor who was angered by not receiving his formal
rejection email suggested holding such a benign, non-event against student
editors when they later applied for teaching jobs. Not only would that be
grossly disproportionate to the students’ alleged “offense,” but this professor
obviously didn’t consider that the students may start blackballing the
professors.
Perhaps journal editors will start passing along, to their successor editorial
boards, the names of professors who repeatedly use the journal for the sole
purpose of jumping into the expedite game. Or worse yet for the professors,
perhaps the editors will begin their own blog to share information with editors
at other journals, much as the professors are currently doing when sharing
information with professors at other schools. In fact, as discussed earlier, one
professor reports that this is already happening, albeit on a small scale (as far
as we know). Some journal editors are already blacklisting authors who are
caught “mak[ing] up an offer to expedite on.” 98 Expanding the blacklist to
include those who employ other tactics—including tactics that professors
widely view as innocuous—is just a few clicks of the keyboard away.
Further, when some professors complain, they aren’t always making
generic comments such as the worn-out criticism that “[l]aw students are
utterly unqualified to judge legal scholarship” 99—an odd complaint, given that
the only thing separating student editors from some of their professors is one
year of law school. 100 Rather, despite a warning from a levelheaded colleague
to leave students’ names off the PrawfsBlawg angsting thread, professors have
publicly identified and criticized individual editors by their school, title, and
name. 101 Perhaps, then, the students will do the same. Is this a risk professors
want to take, particularly when their promotions, status, and sense of selfworth can hinge on the already arbitrary distinction between, for example,
“T50” and “T60”?
Professors should not dismiss the possibility of this type of backlash. After
all, a mere three law students played a substantial, if not primary, role in
98
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exposing other law school tactics, such as some schools’ use of misleading
employment statistics for the purpose of increasing applications and artificially
inflating USN rank. 102 The result of the students’ efforts was greater
transparency and, not surprisingly, a massive reputational and financial hit for
law schools. 103 All it would take is a few enterprising journal editors to start
sharing information and exposing law professor publishing tactics in a similar
manner. The result would be yet another black eye for the academy.
CONCLUSION: PUBLISHING POST-REFORM
The eight-hour offer window discussed in this Essay would not be popular
with many professors. But it is not designed to please the professors; rather,
it is designed to alleviate the problems facing journal editors who receive mass
submissions, yet find it difficult to induce professors to accept an offer of
publication.
As explained earlier, this reform would not temper the professors’ desire
for prestige; however, it would prevent them from using the lower ranked
journals in the mindless pursuit of that prestige. That is, instead of using the
lower ranked journals to keep the class-based machinery operating smoothly,
professors would be forced to take some risks.
For example, if the eight-hour offer was the industry standard then
professors would have to decide when to submit to the top eighty journals,
rather than continuing to wait on the top fifty. On the one hand, being less
class conscious could be rewarded: submitting to the top eighty earlier than
other professors could yield an offer from a very desirable journal, such as the
University of Miami Law Review. On the other hand, because that offer would
come with an eight-hour window, a professor would have to accept it before
the Florida State University Law Review, for example, is able to complete its
review and possibly make its own offer.
Being forced to make such judgments would create a level of angst
previously unknown to the professoriate. Law professors, as a group, are very
risk-averse and would not like the idea of their decisions possibly having suboptimal outcomes as measured by the USN rankings. But this is not a real102
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world problem. If the professor’s work has true value, that value will remain
whether the article is published in the Virginia Law Review or the Vermont
Law Review. Granted, many law school hiring and promotion decisions can
be based on artificial distinctions between, for example, a publication in the
top fifty versus the top sixty. 104 But this is the professoriate’s self-inflicted
problem; it is not the concern of journal editors.
Additionally, nothing about an eight-hour offer window would diminish
any particular professor’s chances of publishing in the higher ranked journals.
Law review placements would still largely be based on things like letterhead
bias, a professor’s connections with professors at more prestigious schools
(who can recommend an article to their students on the law review), and
similar factors that have nothing to do with substance or quality. One newer
professor explained:
Not too long ago, I was an articles editor on a T14 flagship . .
. . To even get to a full committee read, the professor needed
to either (1) be a professor at a T14 law [school] (and not a
clinical prof!), or (2) be named Orin Kerr or Eugene Volokh.
. . . That might suggest that a professor at a Tier 4 school
should aim for lower T50 law reviews and not worry so much
about Cornell, Duke, Yale, etc. 105
For better or worse—well, for worse—all of this hero worship and other
class-driven behavior would continue, even after the adoption of an eight-hour
offer policy. The non-clinical professors at the elite schools would still publish
their articles in the elite journals. Consequently, another professor’s advice to
young academics would still remain sound:
[M]ake friends among professors of the T40 schools, so that
they can recommend your papers to the editors of their
journals. We do not know exactly how much networking and
104
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letter[head] bias affect placement—the beneficiaries will
never admit to being beneficiaries—but they are no doubt
very significant factors. 106

The eight-hour offer reform would leave all of this unchanged. The big
difference under a widely-adopted eight-hour offer policy is that the sub-elite
journals would no longer serve as screening devices. That is, law professors
and the elite journals could no longer rely on them to be the grease that keeps
the class-based machinery humming along smoothly. Instead, the eight-hour
offer would lift the burden from the journal editors who are currently forced
to read, evaluate, and make offers for articles they will never be able to publish.
Not all journals will be interested in change. The elite journals benefit
from the current industry-standard, one-week offer window, as it gives them
plenty of time to review and pickoff articles from lower ranked journals. And
some lower ranked journals may also be inclined to preserve the status quo.
For example, the University of Louisville is currently ranked near the deadmiddle of the USN hierarchy. At best, status-driven professors will view an
offer from its law journal as a likely means to a better offer; at worst, those
professors will treat the journal as one in which they would not, under any
circumstances, publish. Yet, as Timothy Lau explains in his discussion of
letterhead bias, 107 the University of Louisville Law Review has a formal policy
“not to publish articles . . . that have been authored by someone other than a
full-time law faculty member at an American Bar Association accredited law
school.” 108 A journal such as this may not want to implement any change that
could upset the professors it so eagerly seeks to serve.
Fortunately, the reform discussed in this Essay does not need to be systemwide to disrupt the status quo. Rather, a journal’s editors simply need to decide
if they want to continue to serve the needs of the elite journals and the
professors—many of whom revel in child-like distinctions between “T-14”
and “T-20” and would not allow their work to be published outside the “T60”—or if they want to take the first step in implementing meaningful
change. 109 If only a single journal moved to the eight-hour offer window, that
106
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journal would likely gain some respect and reap some immediate benefits;
further, from a larger perspective, other journals would likely follow.
And if enough journals follow, they might even accomplish what one
professor feared: they could “destabilize the entire, highly flawed, law review
system that is central to [law professors’] careers.” 110
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